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I.  Introduction 
For the purposes of this speech,  I  have  taken "corporate governance" 
to mean  the institutions and  procedures  established by  law  concerning the 
decision making of companies.  In common  law  jurisdictions, this implies an 
examination primarily of the board of directors, managing or non-executive, 
and  their relation to the shareholders,  normally acting through their 
general  assembly.  In civil law  countries,  dual  (or two  tier) board structures 
incorporating management  and  supervisory boards  and,  though somewhat  less 
important,  the role of commissioners  ("commissaires" in French,  the "sindaci" 
in Italian) must  also be included.  An  overview of current Ehropean 
developments  and  trends in this field at both national and  Community  levels 
falls  conveniently,  like ancient Gaul,  into three parts:  those concerned with 
supervision of management  on behalf of shareholders,  those concerned with 
such supervision on behalf of employees,  and  finally those concerned with 
such supervision on behalf of some  other interest or interests.  I  propose 
to speak of each of these in turn.  To  simplify,  I  shall also concentrate my 
remarks  on  the "public" as  oppsed to "private" or "closed"  companies.  By 
"public company"  I  mean  those companies  which  can raise capital from  a  large 
number  of sources,  the public,  not  companies  which  are publicly owned. 
II. Supervision of management  on behalf of shareholders 
The  earliest EUropean  conception of supervision of management  on 
behalf of shareholders was  relatively simple:  shareholders, astute in the 
defence of their own  interests, would act on  their own  behalf through the 
general meeting to appoint,  supervise and if necessary remove  those  charged 
with the legal responsibility for managing a  company's  affairs,  the 
directors.  However,  this simple conception had  to be accomodated  to  the 
realities of life relatively quickly.  On  the one hand,  management  decisions 
could not always  be taken by  the entire board of directors.  Delegation of 
decision making  powers  to committees  and  subsequently to individual 
"managing"  or executive directors was  necessary if companies  were  to be 
able to act effectively and  quickly.  On  the other hand, it also became 
clear that not all shareholders were  ready,  or indeed able to supervise for 
themselves  the conduct  of those managing the business.  Other  commitments, 
limitations on their knowledge  and  expertise,  their external position, 
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these and  other factors might limit their real ability to protect their 
nevertheless legitimate interest in a  partieular company.  The  question 
therefore arose of who  might  act effectively in their interest if they 
themselves  could not. 
One  idea which developed early on,  as far back probably as the 
rise of the great Dutch trading companies  such as  the Duth  East  Indies 
Company,  was  the appointment  of "commissioners" by shareholders to supervise 
the directors'  conduct  on  their behalf.  Highly developped in the Netherlands, 
the idea was  also given expression in Belgium,  France,  Italy and Luxembourg. 
In these countries, while the law  has  required the appointment of 
commissioners,  their functions  have been limited to controlling the 
accuracy of company  accounts  and  the legality of their activities.  The 
basic conception behind the "audit committee",  as  you  have  come  to know 
it, thus  has  a  long,  even  distin~ished European ancestry. 
In Germany,  which began its industrialisation relatively late, the 
need  to  encourage investment  through adequate protection of the small 
investor led to a  more radical application of the idea with the creation 
of mandatory dualist or two  tier board structures for certain kinds of 
company.  Since 1870  German  public companies  have had  two  decision-making 
bodies in addition to the general meeting:  a  supervisory council ~Aufsichtsrat") 
and  a  management  board  ( "Vorstand").  The  supervisory council appoints, 
supervises and,  when  necessary,  can replace members  of the management  board. 
The  members  of the supervisory council, with the exception of those who  are 
appointed by the company's  employees,  are normally appointed by the share-
holders  and  can be removed  by them.  Even  under the "quasi parity" system 
of worker  participation in large companies  introduced by the Co-determination 
Act  of 1976,  the shareholders  have  a  decisive influence as to the 
appointment of the chairman of the supervisory council who  in turn has  a 
casting vote in situations in which  the council is equally divided.  The  role 
of the supervisory council as  ~ardian of the shareholders'  interests in 
relation to management  thus remains  of central importance.  The  situation 
in the coal and steel sector is somewhat  different from  that in the rest of 
the economy  due  to special historical reasons.  Time  does  not  permit a  full 
explanation of this system here. - 3 
In the Netherlands,  the "commissioners"  have been developed into 
a  similar dualist system,  since 1971  obligatory for large companies.  In 
France,  a  similar system was  made  available on an optional basis in 1966, 
but the supervisory council is a  notably weaker  body,  which  cannot itself 
replace the management  board but must  secure the agreement of the general 
meeting.  This  weakness  seems  to have  resulted in a  number  of situations 
arising where  disagreements between the management  board and  the supervisory 
council  could not be readily resolved.  For this reason,  the French dualist 
structure has  not yet proved as  popular as  some  had  expected.  In Denmark, 
the law  of 1973  imposes  on larger stock companies  a  similar structure a1 thou.gh 
the management  board has  been given a  less autonomous  role and the upper 
board has management  functions. 
Moreover,  in Member  States which have not introduced formal  dualist 
systems  for all public companies,  namely Belgium,  France,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  the United Kingdom,  nevertheless,  the division of directors 
on  a  single board into executive and  non-executive groups  frequently operates 
to produce in practice a  similar separation of function.  Such  information 
as is available suggests that the non-executive director,  or "outside 
director" as  you  know  him,  is achieving ever widening recognition as a 
watch dog of management  on  the shareholders' behalf.  However,  it is important 
to stress that at present non-executive directors in single board systems 
are often not in reality the equivalent of members  of a  separate supervisory 
institution appointed by and  answerable to the shareholders.  Much  will 
depend  on  the precise facts  of the particular case,  but suffice it to say that 
non-executive directors are frequently in a  minority.  They  are not 
necessarily objective outsiders but possibly well known  to the executive 
directors,  even shall we  say their business associates.  And  on many 
occasions,  they are present not to act so much  as  guardians or supervisors, 
but to provide special  expertise on legal matters, accounting or something 
else.  An  interesting study in this connection is The  Board of Directors 
published by the British Institute of Management  in 1972,  Mana.gEIIlent  Survey 
Report  No.  10,  containing much  objective information as to the role of the 
non-executive director in the UK. 
At  the level of the European  Community,  the Commission  has  sought 
to further the general adoption of mandatory dualist board structures for 
public companies.  Both the proposal for a  EUropean  Companies'  Statute and 
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the proposal  for a  fifth directive on  the structure of public companies 
provide for a  supervisory board which nominates,  supervises and if necessary 
replaces members  of the management  board which  in turn has  the legal 
responsibility for managing the company.  One  of the major  considerations 
which have motivated the Commission  to make  such proposals is the guarantee 
which dualist systems  provide for shareholders who  cannot supervise 
management  effectively for  themselves.  The  trend of developments  in the 
national legal systems is clearly towards  the general adoption of such 
structures at least for large companies.  Proposals for legislation have been 
made  in Belgium  and Luxembourg which may  well be enacted in the foreseeable 
future.  Any  such reform will probably have  an effect as  an example  in 
countries which have yet to take the plunge.  As  we  shall see,  employee 
participation at company  level is likely to act as another incentive for the 
adoption of dualist structures. Of  course,  the Commission will not be taking 
a  formalist position. It is perfectly possible while retaining the idea of a 
single board to arrive at a  dualist system through a  distinction between its 
executive and  non-executive members.  Provided that the distinction between 
the non-executive and  executive functions is clear and the non-executive 
members  are given adequate powers  and  independence,  the Commission  will almost. 
certainly consider its goal  achieved. 
As  for the use of "commissioners" or "audit committees"  and  the like 
there is no  doubt  that these institutions can also perform useful functions, 
though as Italian experience in particular shows,  limitations on their powers 
and  scope of operation can severely limit their real utility. As  a 
transitional means  of developing and strengthening the role of the non-
executive director,  they could conceivably play a  useful role.  But  in our 
view,  they are not in themselves  a  substitute for a  supervisory board with 
power  to supervise effectively tne whole of the management  function. 
Incidentally,  this is perhaps  an appropriate place to make  a  remark 
about  the development  of Community  company  law  in general,  and  the 
harmonization programme  in particular: considerable periods of time are 
inevitably required to effect important changes.  You  may  have been astonished, 
even alarmed,  by my  references  to the Dutch  seventeenth century trading 
companies  and  to nineteenth century German  history.  I  make  no  apology for 
them,  because they show  how  deeply rooted are our legal institutions. Added 
to that is the fact that these institutions have not all developed in 
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precisely the same  way  for reasons  some  of which are valid to this day. 
Finally,  the Community  legislative machine works  by consensus,  so  any 
change  has  to be agreeable to all concerned.  Taken together these factors, 
and others which  I  have not the time to discuss,  explain why  a  Community 
directive on  an important commercial  law matter takes on  average ten years 
from  conception to adoption.  On  the other hand,  when  the direction in which 
institutions are developing can be seen to form  part of a  pattern stretching 
back for many  years,  one is able to decide with greater confidence on  the 
appropriate action at Community  level.  For this reason,  I  am  convinced  that 
the requirement for a  separate,  non-executive supervisory function to 
safeguard shareholder interests in public companies  will  indeed become  a 
general  feature of the legal systems  of the Member  States. 
III. Supervision of management  on behalf of employees 
As  I  know  you  are aware,  recent years  have seen the continued 
development  in :Ehrope  of another important aspect of corporate governance, 
namely  the participation of employees  in the supervision of management. 
Commissioner  Etienne Davignon  has  already explained briefly to you  the 
political and  economic  considerations surrounding this development.  I  would 
like to begin by observing that, whatever one's private political views,  as 
a  matter of fact the spread of this idea has  in recent years been undeniable, 
not only inside the Community,  but in other EUropean  countries,  notably in 
Scandinavia.  When  the Commission made  its first proposal  in this area in 1970 
(proposal  for a  EUropean  Companies  Statute) only one Member  State (Germany) 
had  a  generally applicable reqtiirement  that in large public companies 
employees  should participate in the nomination of the boards of public 
companies.  At  this moment,  three other MEillber  States have already introduced 
such systems,  namely Del.Dilark,  LuxEillbourg  and  the Netherlands.  I  do  not 
include France since employee  representatives are admitted to board meetings 
only in a  consultative capacity and  not as full members.  The  Republic of 
Ireland has  begun to experiment  by introducing the system for five large 
State owned  enterprises,  the most  familiar of which  is Aer  Lingua.  In 
the other four Member  States, serious political debate and  discussion has 
begun and  given the right conjunction of economic  and  political circumstance, 
reform seems  quite likely in the medium  to long term. 
The  Commission  does  not however  underestimate the difficulty of 
the task in those countries which have  a  social system and legal institutions 
which stress the conflict of interest between labour and  capital 
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to the point where  common  interests have  almost been lost from  sight. 
For this reason, it is in favour of a  flexible approach at Community  level 
which will permit the Member  States to adopt systems which are adapted 
to the greatest degree possible to their particular circumstances and 
traditions.  In addition,  time is clearly required to  enable certain 
Member  States to alter their systems  progressively. 
The  Commission  has  suggested that as  a  first step during a 
transitional period Member  States should introduce dualist board structures 
as an option where  such structures are ·not  presently available.  A clear 
distinction between the management  and  supervisory functions will in our 
view favour  the introduction of employee participation at corporate level, 
since it will make  it possible to confine participation to the supervisory 
function.  In general,  neither management  nor labour seems  to favour 
participation in the general management  function itself. 
Second,  the Commission  has suggested that Member  States which 
do  not at present feel able to require employee  participation in the 
appointment of the supervisory board should legislate again as  a 
transitional measure for the creation at corporate level but outside the 
board of an institution representing company  employees.  Such  an institution 
should have  the right to be informed and  consul  tEd  about  the general 
development  of the company's business,  and  in advance  about major specific 
decisions  concerning the company's  future,  for example,  significant new 
investment or disinvestment.  In the Commission's  view,  external representative 
institutions of this kind can provide the practical  experience which will 
enable those concerned to move  on to participation within the board itself 
at a  later date. 
At  present,  the proposed fifth directive on  the structure of 
public companies  and  employee  participation has  not  completed  the 
consultative stage of the Community's  legislative machine.  It will thus 
still be some  years before the Council  can arrive at a  decision on the 
matter,  certainly not before the end  of 1981.  The  final  form  of the 
directive will depend  to a  great extent on  the pace of developments  in 
the Member  States between now  and the date of adoption.  However,  the 
flexible,  progressive approach of the Commission  has received a  considerable 
amount  of support,  in the EUropean  Parliament, in the Economic  and  Social 
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Committee  and in interested circles.  The  major  controversial questions 
at present appear to be the following ones. 
First, as  to the transitional period itself, will it prove  possible 
to agree on a  finite period at the end  of which all national laws  will have 
to choose between a  limited number  of options defined in the directive by 
which  snployees will participate in the appointment of the members  of the 
supervisory boards  of public compa.nies?  For the time being,  the Commission 
considers that such a  finite period should remain the objective.  The  speed 
of development  in the Member  States in the last ten years has  been such 
that there is good  reason to believe that by the time a  directive is adopted 
it will be possible to fix such a  period.  The  experience of these years does 
not  lead one to the conclusion that the next ten will see little change in 
those countries which  have not yet taken the plunge. 
Second,  as  to the specific issue of dual board structures,  the 
value of an institutional distinction between the management  and supervisory 
functions  has  yet to be universally accepted.  In the Commission's  view,  the 
merits of the distinction are such that it will be given increasing, if 
gradual,  application.  From  the shareholder's point of view,  it provides 
a  control which  he often cannot  exercise himself.  From  the employee's 
point of view,  it provides a  means  of being informed about  and  influencing 
the corporation's strategic decision making without the representatives 
crossing that line, rather difficult to define, where  they find themselves 
ceasing to be employee  representatives in a  real sense and  becoming part of 
the management  hierarchy.  The  allegation that dualist structures my  unduly 
li.mi  t  employee  influence because decision making  can be shifted to lower 
levels may  or may  not be justified depending on the circumstances of 
particular cases.  But  any such li.mi tation is  not inherent in the 
institutional distinction and  can be avoided or cured by an appropriate 
allocation of powers  either to all persons  exercising the supervisory 
function,  or possibly,  to a  certain proportion of them. 
Accordingly,  the Commission will continue to argue for the general 
adoption of dualist structures with supervisory and management  boards,  though 
of course it is the substance and not the form  or the labels which  counts  • 
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Finally,  how  should  Community  legislation deal with the question 
of the methods  by which  employees  participate in the appointment of board 
members?  The  Commission  has  never  considered that a  directive could regulate 
these methods  in detail.  The  original proposal  certainly does  not.  There are 
those,  however,  including the EUropean  Trade Union  Confederation (1),  who 
would  like to see the matter left entirely to national law.  At  this stage, 
the Commission's  view is that while not regulating the methods  in detail, 
the directive should seek to include a  number  of principles with which all 
systems  should comply.  As  indicated previously,  the green paper suggested 
that these might be that all employees  should be able to participate in the 
system,  according to methods  guaranteeing a  free  expression of opinion and 
reasonable protection for minorities.  The  Commission's  reasons  for taking 
this position are multiple. 
First, as  a  matter of principle,  the Commission  considers that any 
reform of the decision making structures of companies  in the name  of democracy 
must  embody  the essential features of democratic institutions as  these have 
been slowly and  painfully developed in western EUrope.  If a  system does  not 
embody  such basic principles, it is a  sham.  Second,  for practical reasons, 
the Commission  considers it important that the machinery should be responsive 
to the real needs  and  views  of the employees.  Systems  which do  not  embody 
democratic safeguards are unlikely to perform this task very well.  There is 
then a  risk of pressures building up which have  to find  expression outside 
the system,  perhaps  in a  destructive fashion.  Finally,  a  formally democratic 
character is probably a  necessary part of any compromise  capable of achieving 
a  broad  enough  political consensus  to  enable legislation to be adopted which 
will work  and be respected in practice.  If this consensus  is absent,  even if 
legislation is adopted,  it may  well prove to have disappointing results. 
The  democratic principles proposed by the Commission  would  not 
prevent provision being made  to guarantee that where unions are organized, 
they play an appropriate role in the system.  Techniques  exist in several 
Member  States which have  precisely that purpose.  Other techniques  can no 
doubt be developed more  appropriate to other situations.  But  the Commission 
will seek to  convince the Member  States that we  must  avoid the adoption 
of systems  which  create enfranchised and disenfranchised workers  inside 
the same  company,  and which  can lead to unrepresentative machinery of 
doubtful utility or acceptability. - 9-
In concluding this part, let me  remark  that although European 
developments  as  regards  employee  participation may  seem  alien from  a 
United States point of view,  they may  well not be without significance 
for the USA  in the long term.  The  economic  and  social backgrounds  are 
very different, but probably convergent  in the long run.  The  Bill recently 
introduced into Congress  by Representative William D.  Ford of Michigan on 
plant closures seems  to have been much  influenced by EUropean  co-determination 
law  and  practice.  Should the economic  climate remain difficult with lower 
growth rates and  less  expansion, it would  perhaps  not be surprising if 
organized labour in the U.s.  sought to defend its members  interests by 
insisting on having a  greater say on matters traditionally left to 
management  prerogative. 
IV.  Supervision of management  on behalf of interests other than those of 
companies'  shareholders and  employees 
I  am  aware  that in recent years in the United States, it has  become 
fairly common,  indeed fashionable,  to seek to include on  the boards of large 
companies  "outside directors" representative of interests other than those 
of the companies'  shareholders and  employees.  Members  of minority racial 
groups,  women,  persons associated with environmental or consumer  protection 
or a  locality where  the company  is particularly active have been invited 
to  join the·board in large part as  a  representative of the constituency 
from  which  they come.  Of  course,  such appointments  have been made  in Europe 
too,  but there is little evidence of a  general  trend though from  time to 
time a  particular interest group such as  a  consumer  protection organisation 
will call for progress to be made  in this direction. 
In my  view,  dramatic developments  of this kind in EUrope  are 
unlikely,  and  indeed one  can  even doubt  their desirability.  The  economic 
motive force which  can make  employee  participation in the supervisory 
board work  is clearly identifiable.  Employees,  shareholders and management 
have a  common  interest in increasing or at least maintaining the added  value 
generated by their company.  Conflicts of interest as  to the division of that 
added  value there certainly are,  and appropriate methods  need to be 
developed to resolve them.  But  there can be little doubt  about  the reality 
and strength of the common  interest in added  value.  If one turns to other 
interest groups,  however,  it is difficult to identify a  common  interest of 
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sufficient strength to make  their participation in joint supervision of 
management  by employee  and  shareholder representatives a  workable proposition. 
Indeed,  there seem  to be powerful  potential conflicts of interest as  to the 
company's  generation of added  wlue.  Added  value to the company  may  be a 
price rise to the consumer.  On  the other hand,  environmental  protection 
entailing increased costs may  well  reduce the company's  surplus.  While 
other interests such as  those of consumers  may  need  protection,  there is 
therefore good  reason to doubt  that representation on  corporate boards is 
the best method  of going about it. 
As  a  two-way  channel  for information such representatives may 
perhaps  perform a  limited function,  but in my  view it would  be wrong  to 
expect more  of them  in the :Ehropean  context,  save perhaps  as  a  means  of 
resolving deadlock when it is desired to  give equal representation to 
capital and labour.  However,  even then the representation of the "general 
interest" is not without its difficulties, and it is perhaps  significant 
that while proposals have been made,  no  EUropean  country has  so  far sought 
to implement  such a  system. 
v.  Conclusion 
In a  brief introduction, it is not possible to say all that one 
would  wish on  a  topic as  complex  as  corporate governance.  I  hope  that my 
remarks  will at least have brought out the main lines of European developments 
and  can therefore serve as  a  useful basis for the discussion which  follows. 